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Risk and Prevention in Web-Based Financial Applications A CustomerLink Security White Paper from September 1998
Copyright © 1998 Equifax E-Banking Solutions. All rights reserved. Published September 1998 Trademarks: CustomerLink is a registered trademark of Equifax E-Banking Solutions. All other product names used in this white paper are trademarks, registered trademarks, or trade names of their respective holders. The incredible growth of the Internet is fostering a rapid movement of financial institutions into the electronic arena. In a recent survey, the majority of financial institutions said they were in the process of implementing, or planning to implement some form of Internet presence by the beginning of the next century. The virtual stampede into this new marketplace is being slowed only by a widespread concern for safety and security as confidential information and sensitive payment instructions are launched into the uncharted sea of the World Wide Web. Conversations about the opportunities and pitfalls of "Internet Banking" are to be found in almost every trade magazine and industry forum. This document will attempt to condense the wisdom of those groups for whom the study of the Internet as a vehicle for commercial activity is a full-time occupation. The goal is to educate financial institutions considering the movement toward electronic services of the risks that do exist, and the measures that can be taken to limit those risks. Where applicable, the appropriate link to more information has been provided.
Each financial institution that establishes an Internet presence must take proactive steps to ensure that the systems they own or participate in contain adequate security measures to limit the possibility of unintended distribution of confidential information and the potential for fraud-related losses. The Internet is designed as an open system based on the premise of free access and communication between participating computer systems. While nothing can guarantee complete safety and invulnerability, every effort must be made to provide a safe, secure, and protected platform for financial activity. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's white paper entitled "Security Risks Associated with the Internet" (FDIC Division of Supervision, December 1977), there are five primary areas of risk associated with the provision of financial institution data and the initiation of financial transactions on the Internet. From the FDIC's "Security Risks Associated with the Internet":
Data Privacy and Confidentiality Unless otherwise protected, all data transfers, including electronic mail, travel openly over the Internet and can be monitored or read by others. Given the volume of transmissions and the numerous paths available for data travel, it is unlikely that a particular transmission would be monitored at random. However, programs, such as "sniffer" programs, can be set up at opportune locations on a network, like Web servers (i.e., computers that provide services to other computers on the Internet), to simply look for and collect certain types of data. Data collected from such programs can include account numbers (e.g., credit cards, deposits, loans) or passwords. Due to the design of the Internet, data privacy and confidentiality issues extend beyond data transfer and include any connected data storage systems, including network drives. Any data stored on a Web server may be susceptible to compromise if proper security precautions are not taken.
Potentially, the open architecture of the Internet can allow those with specific knowledge and tools to alter or modify data during a transmission. Data integrity could also be compromised within the data storage system itself, both intentionally and unintentionally, if proper access controls are not maintained. Steps must be taken to ensure that all data is maintained in its original or intended form.
Essential in electronic commerce is the need to verify that a particular communication, transaction, or access request is legitimate. To illustrate, computer systems on the Internet are identified by an Internet protocol (IP) address, similar to a telephone that is identified by a phone number. Through a variety of techniques, generally known as "IP spoofing" (i.e., impersonating), one computer can actually claim to be another. Likewise, user identity can be misrepresented as well. In fact, it is relatively simple to send an e-mail message that appears to have come from someone else, or even send it anonymously. Therefore, authentication controls are necessary to establish the identities of all parties to a communication.
Non-repudiation involves creating proof of the origin or delivery of data to protect the sender against false denial by the recipient that the data has been received or to protect the recipient against false denial by the sender that the data has been sent. To ensure that a transaction is enforceable, steps must be taken to prohibit parties from disputing the validity of, or refusing to acknowledge, legitimate communications or transactions.
Establishing a link between a bank's internal network and the Internet can create a number of additional access points into the internal operating system. Furthermore, because the Internet is global, unauthorized access attempts might be initiated from anywhere in the world. These factors present a heightened risk to systems and data, necessitating strong security measures to control access. Because the security of any network is only as strong as its weakest link, the functionality of all related systems must be protected from attack and unauthorized access. Specific risks include the destruction, altering, or theft of data or funds; compromised data confidentiality; denial of service (system failures); a damaged public image; and any resulting legal implications. Perpetrators may include hackers, unscrupulous vendors, former or disgruntled employees, or even agents of espionage. Stephen Cobb, Director of Special Projects for the National Computer Security Association, summarized these same components in the following quote from the paper "Security Issues in Internet Commerce": The challenge is to transmit and receive information over the Internet while insuring that it is inaccessible to anyone but sender and receiver (privacy), it has not been changed during transmission (integrity), the receiver can be sure it came from the sender (authenticity), the sender can be sure the receiver is genuine (non-fabrication), and the sender cannot deny he or she sent it (non-repudiation).
Considering these areas of potential risk, Web site managers must wage the battle to secure their systems along a very wide front. Successful security requires more than just knowledge of the danger areas; it also depends on the site manager's ability to identify the avenues through which security threats may access internal systems. According to the International Computer Security Association's "Web Site Security: Adoption, Risk & Prevention" (ICSA Release 1.3 November 1997, www.icsa.net) Web site managers must contend with an unsettling array of potential problems: Web-Based Attackers Web-based attackers, more commonly called "hackers," pose the most publicized security challenge. These individuals gain access to systems and the information they contain by exploiting flaws in the configuration of the Web server, the server's operating system, or the actual components of the Web pages. Internal Intrusion Internal intrusion, or the breaching of security systems by someone within the organization who might potentially have authorized access to hardware and software components, is another area of concern. Physical security and password security are paramount in controlling illegal activity within the site manager's own organization. Malicious Code The receipt or distribution of malicious code elements can also cause security risks and, more commonly, malicious harm to Web-based computers and programs. Many Web sites include receipt and distribution of files and programs among the features that are offered to end users. Denial of Service Denial of service and availability must also be a primary concern for site managers. As if protection from interlopers and subversive elements was not enough of a concern, system downtime resulting from power failure, wide-area communications problems, and natural disasters can also result in customer dissatisfaction and ultimate harm to the site manager's company or group. Negligence Security-related negligence in the handling of sensitive data or the configuration of security systems can also be devastating. The best security systems incorrectly administered or improperly managed present increased risk potential. Inadequate policies and procedures can result in security failures or censure from regulatory agencies and auditors. User Authentication User authentication, correctly identifying the individuals that access the Web site, is another risk area that generates much public discussion. The creation and management of adequate user ID and password files or other authentication measures like digital certificates is a detailed process that requires a large amount of time and attention.
Considering the risks associated with Web-based financial applications, and taking into account the potential avenues through which risk factors may present themselves, what are the commercially reasonable security methods available today for the protection of Web-based financial application host sites?
It is not by accident that both the FDIC and the NCSA list data privacy and confidentiality as the first element in their lists of potential security risks. This security component is especially vital to Web-based financial institution activity, since the protection of private personal financial data is one of the cornerstones of the banking industry. Limiting access to information to only those authorized to receive it and transmitting data in a way that ensures privacy are the first steps to successful Internet security. The most common method of restricting data access on the Internet is much older than the technology that utilizes it. User ID and Password requirements were a key component of earlier technology, such as mainframe computer systems and off-the-shelf PC modem-to-modem communication programs. While the correct application of User IDs and Passwords are still vital to Internet security, their implementation has become more sophisticated by necessity. It is no longer enough to require users to identify themselves-it is now vital to protect against sophisticated programs that can replicate the login efforts of a user, utilizing a pattern of codes designed to uncover the authentic User ID and Password assigned to a specific user. It is vital that Web-based financial applications use measures like limiting the number of incorrect logins and the tracking of unsuccessful access attempts in order to protect the confidentiality of the User IDs and Passwords themselves. From a procedural standpoint, it is also vital that financial information providers create and implement secure methods for producing and issuing customer codes. User ID and Password controls must become part of the documented, enforced, and audited procedures of every financial institution that maintains more than a marketing presence on the Internet. Separation of duties and dual control within the operations area that maintains user access information and/or the Web site itself must be maintained as ardently as they are in the cash vault or other key areas of the financial institution. The best technology, poorly managed, will prove ineffective.
Restricting access to sensitive information is the first step toward maintaining data privacy, but financial sites must also take steps to protect this information as it travels across a public, non-secure system. The Internet is by design an open system. It, in and of itself, does not provide secure pathways for private transmission of data. In order for financial institutions to be able to deliver account and transaction summaries, they must utilize encryption methods that will render their transmissions unreadable to parties that are not a part of the conversation. Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol (S-HTTP) are two standardized, widely available technologies to provide encryption of transmissions between Web content providers and browser-based customers. Both of these technologies utilize data scrambling and recompiling methods that render data useless to anyone who does not have the "key" required to read the packet. Most industry-standard browsers support these technologies, and they are relatively easy to implement for commercial Web sites. The field of data encryption is a constantly evolving area of increasingly complex technologies, some so secure that the United States Government has made it illegal for US companies to export the technology outside of its boundaries. For a more detailed discussion of these methods, see the article "Mmm-mmm Good! Alphabet Soup Security" by Chey Cobb, located in the Library pages of the International Computer Security Association Web site (www.icsa.net).
Certificate Authorities and Digital Certificates Certificate Authorities and Digital Certificates are emerging to further address the issues of authentication, non-repudiation, data privacy, and cryptographic key management. A Certificate Authority (CA) is a trusted third party that verifies the identity of a party to a transaction. To do this, the CA vouches for the identity of a party by attaching the CA's digital signature to any messages, public keys, etc., which are transmitted. Obviously, the parties involved must trust the CA, and identities must have been proven to the CA beforehand. Digital Certificates are messages that are signed with the CA's private key. They identify the CA, the represented party, and could even include the represented party's public key. The responsibilities of CAs and their position among emerging technologies continue to develop. They are likely to play an important role in key management by issuing, retaining, or distributing public/private key pairs.
A virtual private network (VPN) is a private data network that makes use of the public telecommunication infrastructure, maintaining privacy through the use of tunneling protocols and security procedures. Using a VPN involves encrypting data before sending it through the public network and decrypting it at the receiving end. An additional level of security involves encrypting not only the data but also the originating and receiving network addresses.
On the Internet, a router is a device, or in some cases software, on a computer that determines the next network point to which a packet should be forwarded toward its final destination. The router is connected to at least two networks and decides which way to send each information packet based on its current understanding of the state of the networks it is connected to. A firewall is the point at which your private company network and a public network such as the Internet connect. A firewall system is a hardware/software configuration that sits between the private and public networks, controlling what traffic is allowed in or out of the private network. Features include logging and reporting, automatic alarms at given thresholds of attack, and a graphical user interface for controlling the firewall. When properly configured, a network firewall can be very effective at keeping out unauthorized users and stopping unwanted activities on the internal network.
Virus Detection and Prevention Because potentially malicious programs can be downloaded directly onto a system from the Internet, virus protection measures beyond the traditional boot scanning techniques should be implemented to properly protect servers, systems, and workstations.
The most obvious element of securing a network is often times the most easily overlooked: physical security, or controlling access to the most sensitive components in your computer network, such as a network administration station or server room. No amount of planning or expensive equipment will keep your network secure if unauthorized personnel have access to central administration consoles. Even if a user does not have evil intent, an untrained user may unknowingly provide unauthorized outside access or override certain protective configurations.
A site security policy is required to establish an enterprise-wide program of how both internal and external users interact with a company's computer network, how the corporate computer architecture topology will be implemented, and where computer assets will be located. The policy should weigh possible threats against the value of personal productivity and also of corporate assets which may need different levels of protection.
Redundancy and Disaster Recovery Redundancy attempts to eliminate any single point of failure that could disrupt communications on a network. Examples of hardware redundancies include RAID 5 disk systems, dual power supplies in file servers, uninterruptible power supplies, and server clustering/failover technologies. It is impossible to over emphasize the need for a good backup and disaster recovery strategy. File system backups not only protect you in case of a hardware failure or accidental deletion, but they also protect against unauthorized changes made by an intruder.
CustomerLink is a Web-based application that allows financial institutions to distribute information and accept service requests from their customers anywhere in the world. Since its basic design is geared toward the browser-oriented world of the Internet and Virtual Private Networks, security has been a consideration from its inception. The CustomerLink system runs on a robust Windows NT operating system. Included in this OS is the capacity to allow only secure connections by end users. Utilizing Secure Socket Layer (SSL) technology, all transmissions of Web pages and data between the financial institution and its customers are completely encrypted and would be unreadable to any person or group that was able to "intercept" the transmission. SSL encryption is industry standard and is commonly used in Internet applications that require security and privacy for sensitive data. CustomerLink also utilizes user IDs and passwords for all incoming callers. Without the proper login, customers cannot see or use any Web pages within the PC Banking site. Password security is fully under the control of the financial institution, and it allows for implementation of dual control for institution operators. CustomerLink also includes its own internal security system based on security groups. Groups are security- and fee-level profiles designed by the financial institution. Each customer loaded into the CustomerLink system is attached to a Customer Group that controls what features they may use and what fees they will be charged. Every system operator set up by the financial institution is attached to an Operator Group that provides detailed controls governing the areas of the system that they may view or change. Financial institutions can establish as many groups as are needed to provide the levels of security that they wish to implement. CustomerLink can be installed as an Internet application, or it can be configured to run on a Private Network. Private Networks, or Intranets, use the same communications technology as the Internet, but access is restricted to only approved individuals. Financial institutions that wish to allow customers to access the system from the Internet or from a Private Network can implement both solutions using the same Web server. The CustomerLink system is also available in a service bureau environment. Financial institutions can simply provide daily data files to the Equifax-operated data center, and service bureau staff members will handle all aspects of system operation and security. For more information on these configurations, see the diagrams included in this document.
CustomerLink and the Windows NT Environment CustomerLink was built using the Microsoft BackOffice Suite of server applications to provide a powerful, scalable, and secure Web development platform. The BackOffice products that comprise the CustomerLink Banking System include Windows NT v4.0, SQL Server v6.5, Internet Information Server v4.0 (IIS), Secure Socket Layer v3.0 (SSL), and Certificate Server v1.0. Windows NT was built from the ground up with the intention of meeting the security criteria for the U.S. Government's C2 Security Evaluation. The critical need for an operating system to be designed for optimum security from the ground up was noted by the NCSC, which wrote in its Final Evaluation Report of the Windows NT operating system: "When security is not an absolute requirement of the initial design, it is virtually impossible through later add-ons to provide the kind of uniform treatment to diverse system resources that Windows NT provides." The robust security architecture of Windows NT Server is used consistently across all BackOffice components, with authentication tied to controlled access to all system resources. IIS integrates into the Windows NT security model and operating system services such as the file system and directory. Because IIS uses the Windows NT Server user database, administrators do not need to create separate user accounts on every Web server, and intranet users need only to log on to their network once. IIS automatically uses the same file and group permissions as the existing file, print, and application servers. Some Web servers install their own security implementations on top of the operating system, creating additional overhead and potential security exposure due to lack of integration and synchronization. Windows NT Server is inherently secure by design. Files and system objects can only be accessed with the proper permissions. User and group accounts are managed by a globally unique identification. When accounts are deleted, all access permissions and group memberships are deleted. So even if a new account is created using a previous user name, none of the permissions are inherited. Certificate Server is a standards-based server application for managing the issuance, revocation, and renewal of digital certificates. Certificate Server generates certificates in standard X.509 format. These certificates can be used for any number of public-key applications including:
To run Certificate Server, a Server ID from a third-party vendor is required to register the server on the Internet and allow for SSL security and authentication. Certificate Server will NOT work without a Server ID. Average cost for a ServerID is $350 per year from Verisign.
CustomerLink security is based on the concept of controlled "groups" that allow each financial institution to establish as many levels of security within the CustomerLink system as are required to meet their needs. There are two kinds of security groups: Operator Groups and Customer Groups. Financial institutions can create as many of each kind of group as they desire, creating levels of security that are appropriate for their particular configuration. Financial institutions may also remove options from their scripts and Web pages completely so that no customers can access them regardless of the group to which they are assigned. Operator Groups Operator Groups provide a very detailed level of control. For each action within the CustomerLink system, operators can be restricted altogether, be allowed only to view the data, or be allowed to add, edit, and change the data. Two default Operator Groups are delivered with CustomerLink. The Technical Group allows operators to perform all operator actions within the system except for security functions. The CSR Group is designed for operators with very limited system duties related to customer maintenance or retrieval of customer-initiated messages. Security Officers In addition to being placed in an Operator Group, an operator can also be designated as a Security Officer. Like operators in the Technical Group, Security Officers are allowed to perform all actions within the system. Security Officers also have the authority to add other operators or change the profile of existing operators. Each financial institution usually has only a single Security Officer, with an additional security login stored under dual control in a secure location. Customer Groups Customer Groups provide access control in much the same manner as Operator Groups. When added to the system, each new customer must be assigned to a Customer Group. As customers access the CustomerLink Web pages, they will be limited to performing actions authorized by their Customer Group, and they will be restricted to specific amount limits designated individually for each of those actions. Three default groups are delivered with CustomerLink. The Main Group allows users to perform all of the actions available. The Restricted Group allows customers to view their account information, but blocks them from performing any transactions within the system. The Demo Group allows financial institutions to set up customers and accounts that can be used by potential system users to see how the system works. Demo customers can perform all transactions within the system, but those transactions are not included in the daily reports and files used by the financial institution. The Demo Group blocks customers from changing the Setup information (such as the Password) related to the demo customer. Customer Groups also control the amount that users are charged for performing any action in the system. Financial institutions that wish to implement different fee levels for different sets of customers may also utilize multiple Customer Groups for that reason. Web Page Settings In addition to Customer Groups, financial institutions can easily remove options from their Web site through the Web Page Settings option in the CustomerLink Administration program. This will make those options, as well as the links and Help files associated with them, unavailable for all customers. This process can be performed by any operator with the proper security rights and requires no special Web page programming or customization. Glossary of Terms This list includes terms mentioned in this document as well as a few other concepts and phrases found in the field of Internet security. This list is by no means exhaustive. Abuse of Privilege: When a user performs an unacceptable action, according to organizational policy or law. Application-Level Firewall: A firewall system in which service is provided by processes that maintain complete TCP connection state and sequencing. Application-level firewalls often re-address traffic so that outgoing traffic appears to have originated from the firewall, rather than the internal host. All-in-one Box: A system that contains the set of Internet services required for a fully functional Internet presence, all included in a single appliance. Authentication: The process of determining the identity of a user who is attempting to access a system. Authentication Token: A portable device used for authenticating a user. Authentication tokens operate by challenge/response, time-based code sequences, or other techniques. This may include paper-based lists of one-time passwords. Authorization: The processes of determining what types of activities are permitted. Usually, authorization is in the context of authentication: once you have authenticated a user, they may be authorized different types of access or activity. Bastion Host: A system that has been hardened to resist attack, and which is installed on a network in such a way that it is expected to potentially come under attack. Bastion hosts are often components of firewalls, or may be "outside" Web servers or public access systems. Generally, a bastion host is running some form of general-purpose operating system (e.g., UNIX, VMS, WNT, etc.) rather than a ROM-based or firmware operating system. Challenge/Response: An authentication technique whereby a server sends an unpredictable challenge to the user, who computes a response using some form of authentication token. Chroot: A technique under UNIX whereby a process is permanently restricted to an isolated subset of the file system. Cryptographic Checksum: A one-way function applied to a file to produce a unique "fingerprint" of the file for later reference. Checksum systems are a primary means of detecting file system tampering on UNIX. Data-Driven Attack: A form of attack in which the attack is encoded in innocuous-seeming data, which is executed by a user or other software to implement an attack. In the case of firewalls, a data-driven attack is a concern since it may get through the firewall in data form and launch an attack against a system behind the firewall. Defense in Depth: The security approach whereby each system on the network is secured to the greatest possible degree. This term may be used in conjunction with firewalls. DNS Spoofing: Assuming the DNS name of another system by either corrupting the name service cache of a victim system, or by compromising a domain name server for a valid domain. Dual-Homed Gateway: A dual-homed gateway is a system that has two or more network interfaces, each of which is connected to a different network. In firewall configurations, a dual-homed gateway usually acts to block or filter some or all of the traffic trying to pass between the networks. Encrypting Router: see Tunneling Router and Virtual Network Perimeter. Firewall: A system or combination of systems that enforces a boundary between two or more networks. Host-based Security: The technique of securing an individual system from attack. Host-based security is operating system and version dependent. Insider Attack: An attack originating from inside a protected network. Intrusion Detection: Detection of break-ins or break-in attempts either manually or via software expert systems that operate on logs or other information available on the network. IP Spoofing: An attack whereby a system attempts to impersonate another system by using its IP network address. IP Splicing/Hijacking: An attack whereby an active, established session is intercepted and co-opted by the attacker. IP Splicing attacks may occur after an authentication has been made, permitting the attacker to assume the role of an already authorized user. Primary protections against IP Splicing rely on encryption at the session or network layer. Least Privilege: Designing operational aspects of a system to operate with a minimum amount of system privilege. This reduces the authorization level at which various actions are performed and decreases the chance that a process or user with high privileges may be caused to perform unauthorized activity resulting in a security breach. Logging: The process of storing information about events that occurred on the firewall or network. Log Retention: How long audit logs are retained and maintained. Log Processing: How audit logs are processed, searched for key events, or summarized. Network-Level Firewall: A firewall in which traffic is examined at the network protocol packet level. Perimeter-Based Security: The technique of securing a network by controlling access to all entry and exit points of the network. Policy: Organization-level rules governing acceptable use of computing resources, including security practices and operational procedures. Proxy: A software agent that acts on behalf of a user. Typical proxies accept a connection from a user, make a decision as to whether or not the user or client IP address is permitted to use the proxy, perhaps does additional authentication, and then completes a connection on behalf of the user to a remote destination. Screened Host: A host on a network behind a screening router. The degree to which a screened host may be accessed depends on the screening rules in the router. Screened Subnet: A subnet behind a screening router. The degree to which the subnet may be accessed depends on the screening rules in the router. Screening Router: A router configured to permit or deny traffic based on a set of permission rules installed by the administrator. Session Stealing: See IP Splicing/Hijacking. Trojan Horse: A software entity that appears to do something normal but which, in fact, contains a "trapdoor" or attack program. Tunneling Router: A router or system capable of routing traffic by encrypting it and encapsulating it for transmission across an untrusted network, for eventual de-encapsulation and decryption. Social Engineering: An attack based on deceiving users or administrators at the target site. Social engineering attacks are typically carried out by telephoning users or operators and pretending to be an authorized user, to attempt to gain illicit access to systems. Virtual Network Perimeter: A network that appears to be a single protected network behind firewalls, which actually encompasses encrypted virtual links over untrusted networks. Virus: A self-replicating code segment. Viruses may or may not contain attack programs or trapdoors. |
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